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Equity

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Equity means fairness. Generally, a court of Equity does not run on the principles of morality except when it is mixed with the administration of civil rights in property.

Definitions on Equity

  • Equity is that portion of natural justice, thought of such a nature as to admit of being judicially enforced, was omitted to be enforced by the Common Law Courts, an omission which was supplied by the Court of Chancery.

Equity and Common Law

  • It is often felt that Equity is actually an addendum to Common Law. Though equity provides a distinct set of rules, they are not to supersede the Common Law.
  • "Equity has come not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it" - Maitland
  • The jurisdiction of Equity can be found in three sources:
    • Inflexible procedures in Common Law
    • Inadequate or remedy at Common Law
    • Absence of relief in certain cases owing to defective procedure.
  • Equity is not a self-sufficient system - Maitland
  • Equity depends a lot on Common Law. If Common Law is to be abolished, Equity just perishes
  • Equity was not a system at all but is rather a collection of additional rules.
  • "Equity does not destroy the law, nor create it, but assist it" - Lord Talbot
  • "Equity without Common law would have been a caste in the air, an impossibility" - Maitland

Related Cases / Recent Cases / Case Law

  • Sarat Kamini v Nagendra, (1925) 29 CWN 973: In all actions, the Court is to apply the law of limitation enhanced in the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, and the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, "enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operations or introduce exceptions not recognized by it.
  • Hopkins v Hopkins, (1739) 1 Atk 581: "It is the maxim of this Court that trust estates, which are the creatures of equity, shall be governed by the same rules as legal estates, in order to preserve the uniform rules of property".
  • Pugh v Heath, (1882) 7 App Cas 235 (237): The net effect of Judicature Acts is "not to create two courts - a court of law and equity"
  • Walsh v Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 9 (14): In regard to Judicature Acts, it is now one Court which is a court of complete jurisdiction, legal and equitable, and in case of any possible conflict, the rules of equity will prevail in it.
  • Akshyalingam v Avayambala, AIR 1933 Mad 386; Kishorechand v Badaun ESC, AIR 1944 Al 66 (77), Namdeo v Narmadabai, AIR 1953 SC 2228; Muralilal v Devkaran, AIR 1965 C 225; Ganeshilal v Joti, AIR 1953 SC 1; Valliama v Sivathanu, AIR 1979 SC 1937 (paras 29, 31): Where the Act is silent or the Act does not apply, the English principles may be resorted to in so far as they are consonant within the principles of 'justice, equity and good conscience'.
  • Salt v Cooper (1880) 16 Ch D 544: "The main object of the Judicature Act, 1873, was to assimilate the transaction of equity business and common law business by different courts of judicature. It has been sometimes inaccurately called 'the fusion of law and equity'; but it was not any fusion or anything of the kind; it was the vesting in one tribunal the administration of law and equity in every case, action, or dispute which should come before the tribunal. That was the meaning of the Act. Then as to that very small number of cases in which there is an actual conflict, it was decided that the rules of equity should prevail. That was to be the mode of administering the combined jurisdiction."
  • Yeswant v Walchand, (1950) SCR 852 (868): The Supreme Court held that, "Rules of equity have no application where there are definite statutory provisions specifying the grounds on the basis alone the stoppage or suspension of running of time can arise. While the Courts are necessarily astute in checkmating fraud, it should be equally borne in mind that statutes of limitation are statutes of repose".
  • Nagendranath v Suresh, AIR 1932 PC 165: There cannot be any equitable construction of a statute of limitation. The Privy Council observed that, "The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide".
  • Luchmee v Ranjeet, 20 WR 375 PC: "Very little reflection is necessary to show that great hardships may occasionally be caused by statutes of limitation in case of poverty, distress and ignorance of rights; yet the statutory rules must be enforced according to their ordinary meaning in these and in other like cases".
  • Ariff v Jadunath, (1931) 31 CWN 550 PC: The law of registration cannot be overridden by applying an equitable doctrine, such as part performance. "Nor can equity override a statute and confer upon a person a right which the statue enacts shall be conferred only by a registered instrument".
  • Probodh v Dantmara Tea Co, (1949) 45 CWN 132 PC: The law of registration cannot be overridden by applying an equitable doctrine. Nor can the formalities laid down by the law of transfer be override by any such doctrine.
  • Commissioner of IT v Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216 (para 3): Taxation being a creature of statute, there is no equity of tax.
  • CIT v Motor and General Stores, AIR 1968 SC 200 (Para 6); Bank of Chettinad v CIT, AIR 1940 PC 183: If a person within the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to he judicial mind be.
  • Lake v Gibson, (1729) 1 Eq Ca 294: "A constructive trust may arise when a person, who is only a part owner, acting bona fide - permanently benefits an estate by repairs or improvements; for a lien or trust may arise in his favor in respect of the sum he has expanded in such repairs or improvements".
  • Russel v Russel, (1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 269: If a man pledges his title-deeds as a security for a loan, he must pay the money before he wants to get bck the deeds, though a mortgage of land cannot be created without writing by reason of the Statute of Frauds.
  • Muralidhar v International Film Co, AIR 1943 PC 14: Since the obligation to restore the benefit is absolute under Section 64 of the Contract Act, where a contract is rescinded under Section 39 (because the defendant has refused to perform or disable himself from performing), the plaintiff has to restore the benefit even though he is entitled to obtain damages from the defendant for the breach of the contract.
  • Ram Sarup v Brij Mohan, AIR 1938 Oudh 14: No compensation is payable where the contract is without consideration.
  • Gaya Prasad v Sarfaraz, 19 IC 972: The discretion conferred upon the Court under Section 41 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 should not be interpreted and exercised as only to impose upon a plaintiff seeking relief by way of cancellation of an instrument such conditions as the law would impose upon him if position of the parties were reversed and he were the defendant in the suit brough to enforce the instrument according to its terms.
  • Ajit Singh v Bejai Bahadur, 11 Cal 61 PC: In regard to Specific Relief, 'Justice of the case' requires that the parties should be restored to the position which they occupied at the time the contract was entered in. "Upon the cancellation of instrument of hypothecation and sale on proof of fraud and collusion between the grantee, who had advanced money, and the manager of the grantor's estate, the grantor having been unduly influenced in the transaction, it was held that the condition of cancellation should be not the repayment of all money received by the manager, but only of sums shown to have been paid to the grantor personally and of such sums received by the manager as he would have been justified in borrowing in the course of a prudent management of the estate.
  • Syedul v Ariff, (1916) 21 CWN 257 PC: Though a contract with a minor is void, when a person purchases property from a minor without knowledge of the executant's minority, the sale can be rescinded on the ground of the executant's minority only on condition that the minor refunds to the purchaser the amount of consideration received from him.
  • Harnath v Indar, 45 All 179 PC, Sadique v Jai Kishore, (1928) 32 CWN 874 PC: Though a minor is not personally liable to repay a loan, where he induces a person to enter into a contract with him on fraudulent representation that he is a major, then unless the other party was himself aware of the fact of minority, the minor can have the contract set aside only on restoring the benefit he received from the contract eg: on condition of refund of purchase money in the case of sale.
  • Mohiri Bibee v Dharmodas, 30 Cal 539 PC: The Court would refuse to exercise its discretionary powers under Section 41 of Specific Relief Act, where the defendant had advanced money to the minor with full knowledge of infancy. "A mortgagor employing an attorney who also acts for the mortgagee in a mortgage transaction, must be taken to have notice of all the facts brought to the knowledge of the attorney and therefore where the Court rescinded the contract of mortgage on the ground of the mortgagor's infancy and found that the attorney had notice of the infancy, or was put upon inquiry as to it, it was held that the mortgagor was not entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act".
  • Suraj v Chain Sukh A 1927 PC 257; Krishen v Nathu, (1927) 49 All 149 (PC): In Hindu Law, when an alienation by a widow was set aside at the instance of a reversioner on the ground of legal necessity, and the transferee acted in good faith and after inquiry as to its existence, the alienation would be upheld in toto, even though a part of the consideration money is not eventually applied for the purpose of necessity; no question of application of the equitable principle arises in such a case.
  • Nagappa v Brahadambal, (1935) 39 CWN 709 (PC): In adjusting the equity between parties, the Court cannot make a new bargain between the parties and uphold that the alienation of a proportionate part of the property; the alienation must be set aside in toto but on terms of repayment of the consideration money as was justified. This principle was applied in setting aside alienation by other limited owners such as the proprietor of an impartible estate.
  • Ramsundar v Lachmi, (1929) 33 CWN 699 (PC): In adjusting the equity between parties, the Court cannot make a new bargain between the parties and uphold that the alienation of a proportionate part of the property; the alienation must be set aside in toto but on terms of repayment of the consideration money as was justified. This principle was applied in setting aside alienation by other limited owners such as the manager of a Hindu joint family.
  • Iswar Lakshmi Durga v Surendra, (1941) 45 CWN 665: In adjusting the equity between parties, the Court cannot make a new bargain between the parties and uphold that the alienation of a proportionate part of the property; the alienation must be set aside in toto but on terms of repayment of the consideration money as was justified. This principle was applied in setting aside alienation by other limited owners such as the Shebair of a Deity.
  • Vallabhdas v Development Office, (1929) 53 Bom 589 (PC): The person entitled for benefit under Section 51 of Transfer of Property Act must be a transferee. A trespasser or a stranger building upon a land, knowing it to be the land of another, is not entitled to any equity, and the true owner can recover the land together with all improvements made by the trespasser.
  • Vallabhdas v Development Office, (1929) 53 Bom 589 (PC): When the plaintiff's claim is tainted with some illegality or fraud, in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, a Court of equity will refuse to aid him.
  • Overton v Banister, (1844) 3 Hare 503: An infant concealing her age obtained from her trustees a sum of stock to which she was entitled only on coming of age. Subsequently she instituted a suit against the trustees, to compel them to pay over against the stock which has been improperly being paid to her during minority. Held, that though the receipt of an infant was ineffectual to discharge a debt, yet the infant, having misrepresented her age, could not set up the invalidity of the receipt.
  • Smith v Clay, (1767) 3 Bro CC 640: Lord Camden held, "A Court of Equity has always refused its aid to state demands, where a party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this Court into activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence; when these are wanting the Court is passive and does nothing."
  • Black v Gale, (1886) 32 Ch 581: Delay will be fatal to a claim for equitable relief if the plaintiff has so acted as to induce the defendant to alter his position on the reasonable faith that he was released or abandoned his claim. But apart from such circumstance, delay will be immaterial.
  • Allcard v Skinner, (1887) 36 ChD 145: As there can be no abandonment of a right without full knowledge, legal capacity, and free will, ignorance or disability or undue influence, will be a satisfactory explanation of delay.
  • Hall v Otter, 52 Eq 522: "The defense of laches and acquiescence are cognate but not correlative; they both sprang from the cardinal rule that 'he who seeks equity, must do equity'. Acquiescence, however, properly speaking, relates to inaction during the performance of act. Laches relates to delay after the act is done".
  • Knight v Simmonds, (1896) 2 ChD 297: "When a Court of equity is asked to enforce a covenant by decreeing specific performance or granting an injunction, in other words, when equitable as distinguished from legal relief is sought, equitable as distinguished from legal defenses may have to be considered. The conduct of the plaintiff may disentitle him from relief; his acquiescence in what he complaints of, or his delay in seeking relief, may of itself be sufficient to preclude him from obtaining it".
  • Kochunu v Kuttanunni, AIR 1948 PC 47: There is no acquiescence where the party is under a mistake as to the true legal position.
  • Smith v Smith, (1875) LR 20 Eq 500: If the person doing the act himself knew that he was doing a wrong, the defense of acquiescence will not be available against the rightful owner.
  • Duke of Leeds v Earl of Amherst, (1846) 78 RR 47: If a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing with the property in a manner inconsistent with that right, and makes no objection while the act is in progress, he cannot afterwards complain. That is the proper sense of the wrong acquiescence.
  • Ameerunissa v Ashrufunessa, 17 WR 259 PC: A considerable delay, if unexplained, may sometimes raise a presumption against the existence of the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, and induce the Court to look with very great jealousy at the evidence produced in support of it.
  • Magniram v Kasturbhai, (1921) 46 Bom 481 PC: It is the policy of law being to secure quiet possession to people who are in apparent lawful holding of an estate, lapse of a long time, coupled with the absence of evidence as to the circumstances in which the possession commenced, leads to a presumption that it originated in a lawful title.
  • Gaurisankar v Jiwan, (1927) 32 CWN 257 PC: Where the validity of a permanent lease or transfer made by a limited owner (such as a shebait) comes into question after a long time after the grant, so that it is not possible to ascertain the circumstances in which it was made, the Court should assume that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid.
  • Venkata v Rani Saheba, (1919) 43 Mad 541 (345) PC: In no circumstances, presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which have been obliterated by time.
  • Bangachandra v Jagat, (1916) 21 CWN 225 PC: Laches may also be a ground for refusing a relief which the Court has a discretion to grant or refuse. Ex: Costs
  • Beniram v Kundakakm (1899) 21 All 496 PC: The doctrine of equitable estoppel as enunciated in the case is an application of the principle of acquiescence
  • Uda Begum v Imamuddin, (1879) 1 All 82: Where there is more than mere laches, where there is conduct or language inducing a reasonable belief that a right is foregone, the party who acts upon the belief so induced, and whose position is altered by this belief, is entitled in this country, as in other countries, to plead acquiescence and the plea, if sufficiently proved, ought to be held a good answer to an action, although the plaintiff may have brought his suit within the period of prescribed by law of limitation.
  • Lake v Craddock, (1732) 3 P Wms 158: If partners buy land for the business of the firm, they are always regarded as tenants in common.
  • Dering v Winchelsea, (1787) 1 Cox 318: The doctrine of contribution as between joint debtors and sureties is also founded on the principle viz. that when several persons are debtors, all shall be equal and if the creditor does not make them contribute equally, the Court of Equity will secure that object.
  • Fletcher v Green, (1864) 33 Beav 426: When trustees are equally to blame for a breach of trust, they are jointly and severally liable to the beneficiaries, and when and of them makes good and breach, he is entitled to contribution from his co-trustees.
  • Kazim v Sadiq, (1938) 42 CWN 900 PC: A heir under Mohammedan Law is bound to contribute towards debits properly paid by his co-heir to the extent of his share, even though different portions of the assets devolve according to different rules of descent.
  • Lalta Prasad v Zahuruddin, 32 All 479 (483): In the absence of a contrary intention in the contract, a joint promisor has a right of contribution against co-promisors, if the promisee has compelled him to perform the entire contract or recovered more than what was due in his share.
  • Ram Preshad v Neerbhoy, (1872) 11 BLR 76: The right to contribution arises after the debt has been discharged by the person who claims it and not before it; mere existence of a decree against him is not enough.
  • Narendra v Pashupati, AIR 1949 Cal 242: The promisee cannot, by any action on his part, absolve a joint promisor from his liability to contribute.
  • Kidar v Hari, (1952) SCR 179: In regard to contribution between co-mortgagors, the Supreme Court has held that the law on this subject is contrained in Section 82 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that the provisions of this section are not be modified by anything contained in Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 or on equitable considerations.
  • Kidar v Hari, (1952) SCR 179: The principle underlying the Section 82 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, co-mortgagors are bound to contribute proportionately to the value of the shares or parts of the mortgaged property owned by them and not in proportion to the extent of the benefits derived by each of them.
  • Ganeshi v Joti, AIR 1953 SC 1; Valliama v Sivathanu, AIR 1979 SC 1937: In regard to contribution between co-mortgagors, the English equitable principle has been applied to an which the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 did not extent.
  • Parkin v Thorold, (1852) 16 Beav 59: Courts of Equity made a distinction in all cases between that which is matter of substance and that which is matter of form; and if it finds, that by insisting on the form, the substance will be defeated, it holds it to be inequitable to allow a person to insist on such form, and thereby defeat the substance.
  • Walsh v Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 9: With regard to an executory contract for lease of land, a person, who enters into possession of land under an agreement for lease, which is specifically enforceable, is regarded as between himself and the other party as being in the same position as if the lease had been actually granted to him.
  • Walsh v Lonsdale, (1882) 21 Ch D 9: The doctrine will not apply in India because no distinction is made between legal and equitable interests.
  • Holrody v Marshall, (1862) 10 HLC 191: Non-existing property (to be acquired at a future time) is not assignable. In equity, such assignment is possible; the agreement operates upon the property the moment it comes into existence and becomes a complete equitable assignment.
  • Performing Rights Society v London Theatre, (1924) AC 113: "When a person executes a document purporting to assign property to be afterwards acquired by him, that property on its acquisition, passes in equity to the assignee.
  • Tailby v Official Receiver, (1888) 13 AC 523: An assignment of future book-debts passes the equitable interest in book-debts acquired after the assignment. The only condition for the application of this doctrine is that the property must be ascertainable or identifiable at the time when the Court is asked to enforce the contract.
  • Mian Pir Bux v Mahomed Tahar, (1934) 60 CLJ 370 PC: The equitable right is not available in violation of the Indian statute.
  • Delhi Motor Company v Basrukar, AIR 1968 SC 794: If A sues B for ejectment, B cannot raise the defense that he is in possession in pursuance of an unregistered agreement for lease or sale.
  • Tolaram v State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496: The Supreme Court has tested to determine whether a particular document constitutes a lease or a mere agreement for lease.
  • Ram Baran v Ram Mohit, AIR 1967 SC 744: "The second paragraph of Section 40 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 makes a substantial departure from the English law, for an obligation under a contract which creates no interest in land but which concerns land is made enforceable against an assignee of the land who takes from the promisor either gratuitously or takes for value but with notice.
  • Perhlad v Buddhoo, (1869) 12 MIA 275: "The bill of sale in such a case can only be evidence of a contract to be performed in future, and upon the happening of a contingency, of which the purchaser may claim a special performance, if he comes into Court shewing that he has himself done all that he was bound to do."
  • Vatsavyaya v Poosapati, AIR 1924 PC 162: When an assignee of a non-existent property in India gets after the property comes into existence is not any equitable interest in the property, but a mere personal right to have the agreement to assign specifically performed by the assignor. The principle applies to assignment by sale, mortgage or charge.
  • Lechmere v Eark of Carlistle, (1773) 3 PW 211: Where a person covenants for valuable consideration to purchase and settle lands upon certain trusts, and subsequently purchases land of the nature of those covenanted to be settled, but he retains such lands unsettled till his death, equity will presume that such lands were purchased in performance of covenant and are bound by it.
  • Blandy v Widmore, (1716) 1 PW 323: Where a person covenants for a valuable consideration that he will leave by will a certain legacy or annuity, and subsequently dies intestate, or by his will leaves a different sum or annuity to such person - equity will presume that any share of the covenantor's estate received by such person under the intestacy or different sum or annuity left by his will is a complete or pro tant performance of the covenant.
  • Tollet v Tollet, (1728) 2 P Wms 489 (490): The doctrine of relief against defective execution: A defective execution ... will always be aided in equity under the circumstances mentioned, in being the duty of every man to pay his debts, and a husband or father to provide for his wife or child.
  • Penn v Baltimore, (1750) 1 Ves 444: The plaintiff and defendant being in England, had entered into articles for settling the boundaries of two provinces in America - Pennsylvania and Maryland - and the plaintiff sought a specific performance of the articles; for "the strict primary decree for this Court is in personam".
  • Ewing v Orr-Ewing, (1885) 10 AC 433: Equity entertains action respecting immovables abroad if there is some contract or equity against a person in England eg: Action for administration.
  • Deschamps v Miller, (1908) 1 Ch 856: If an action merely involves a question of title to land outside jurisdiction, the English Court will not entertain the action, for the question of title can be better dealt with by the Courts of the country in which the land is situated. It will adjudicate on a question of title only when there is some personal obligation arising out of contract or implied contract, fiduciary relation or fraud, or other conduct which in the view of an English Court of Equity would be unconscionable.
  • Bilasrai v Shivnaran, (1943) 48 CWN 448 (PC): The Court of Equity will protect and preserve the funds of a charity conducted in a foreign country, by its jurisdiction over the trustees in personam, it will not interpose its authority, for the purpose of giving directions for the administration of charity because it is not in a position to supervise its administration effectively. It will leave questions relating to the administration of the trust, such as removal and appointment of trustees, to be dealt with by the Courts of the country where the charity is carried on and its beneficiaries reside.
  • Morocco Syndicate v Harris, (1895) 1 Ch 534: Since a Court of Equity will not make orders it cannot enforce, it will not issue an injunction to restrain a defendant within its jurisdiction from committing a tort outside its jurisdiction.
  • Re Nisbett and Potts Contract, (1906) 1 Ch 386: An equitable right could also be enforced against a disseisor i.e., one who has acquired title by lapse of time. It is enforced against those who would have known of the trust had they behaved as prudent purchasers behave.
  • Pilcher v Rawlins, (1872) 7 Ch 259: Against a person who acquires a legal right bona fide, for value, without notice, express or constructive, of the existence of equitable rights, those rights are of no avail.
  • Webb v McPherson, (1903) 8 CWN 41 PC: The law in India recognizes no distinction between legal and equitable estate or interests.
  • Ram Kinkar v Satyacharan, (1938) 43 CWN 281 (PC): Under Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it is "an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein". This case affirmed that the TPA is a self-contained code and "it has left no room for such a distinction."
  • Imperial Bank of India v Rai Gyaw, (1923) 28 CWN 473 (PC): Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does away with the question of priority between legal and equitable estates as obtained in England, subject only to Section 78.
  • Le Neve v Le Neve, (1747) 1 Amb. 436: Fraud or mala fides is the true ground on which the Court is governed in the cases of notice.
  • Lloyd v Bankes, (1868) LR 3 Ch 488: In Actual Notice, knowledge of the fact is brought directly home to the party. But, a person is not bound to attend to vague rumors, and actual notice, in order to be binding, must be defined information given by a person interested in the property in respect of which the notice is issued, in the same transaction, "so that a reasonable man, or an ordinary man of business, would act upon the information and would regulate his conduct by it".
  • Espin v Pemberton, (1859) 3 De G & J 547 (554): Constructive Notice has been defined as "knowledge which the Court imputes to a person from the case, upon a presumption, so strong that it cannot be allowed to be rebutted, that the knowledge must be thought it may not have been formally communicated."
  • Jones v Smith (1 Hare 43): Constructive Notice is of several kinds. In this case, they are grouped into two classes.
  • Bisco v Earl of Bombay, (1676) 1 Ch Ca 287: The purchaser had actual notice of a specific mortgage, but did not inspect the mortgage deed, which referred to other incumbrances. Held, he was bound by those incumbrances, for he would have discovered their existence if he had inspected the deed, as any prudent man would have done.
  • Hunt v Luck, (1902) 1 Ch 428: Where third party is in possession, or the appearance of the property is such as to put a party upon inquiry, and he chooses not to make inquiries, whatever title he acquires will be subject to the right of the person in possession. Thus, occupation by a tenant is notice of all the rights of the tenant.
  • Birch v Ellames, (1794) 2 Anst. 427: Knowledge imputed by the Court from the evidence that the party has designedly abstained from inquiry for the very purpose of avoiding notice. The title deeds of an estate were deposited with the by way of security. The defendant, 14 years afterwards, and on the eve of the mortgagors bankruptcy, took a mortgage of the property, with notice of the deposit, but he abstained from inquiring the purpose for which the deposit had been made. Held, that the defendant was bound by the plaintiff's rights, as he had designedly omitted enquiry for the purpose of avoiding notice of the plaintiff's rights.
  • Re Nisbet and Potts Contract, (1906) 1 Ch 386: .. Nor is a purchaser taking a title depending on adverse possession protected from the equity on the ground that the "squatter from whom he buys had no actual notice of the equity, from a squatter is not a purchaser for value without notice".
  • Agra Bank v Barry, (1874) 7 HL 135: The purchaser is deemed to have constructive notice of any equity affecting the property, because he has negligently omitted to make the usual investigation of title which any prudent purchaser should make, though without any fraudulent design.
  • Ramcoomar v McQueen, (1870) 18 WR 166 PC: Even apart from statutory provisions, the doctrine (of Constructive notice) is applied, in the absence of any statutory provision governing the case, as a principle of justice, equity and good conscience.
  • Dan Koer v Sarla Devi, (1946) 51 CWN 81 (87) PC: "The knowledge of collateral rights created by agreement, in equity, frequently qualifies those acquired by a purchaser. The widow's rights to maintenance is a right maintainable against the holders of the ancestral estate in virtue of their holding no less through the operation of the law that if it had been created by agreement, and so when the sale prevents its being otherwise satisfied, it accompanies the property as a burden annexed to it to in the hands of a vendee with notice that it subsist".
  • Dan Koer v Sarla Devi, (1946) 51 CWN 81 (87) PC: A transferee without notice is not bound unless the right is charged upon a particular property, in which latter case even a transferee without notice is not protected.

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